Selim Ibraimi– North Macedonia remains blocked from opening chapters with the EU, not only because of Sofia’s demands, but also because of the resentment of official Skopje. While the EU has allocated 6 billion euros to support the integration and economic development of the Balkans, the government of Prime Minister Hristijan Mickoski seems to be relying on rhetoric and inaction. Resolving the dispute with Bulgaria through constitutional changes and active diplomacy is the key to opening the EU’s doors. The question arises as to why official Skopje should act now? “If Ukraine had waited as long as North Macedonia to start negotiations, it would have started accession negotiations in 2045. North Macedonia is a sad story in the Balkans, along with Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos said in an interview with Radio Free Europe.
The open issue between Bulgaria and North Macedonia has long-term consequences for Skopje’s EU membership and more generally affects the security and stability of the Balkans. But since last year, the tough stance of Prime Minister Hristijan Mickoski’s government towards Bulgarian demands has raised concerns that passivity and buying time have replaced the commitment made to make changes and follow the EU process. Time shows that this may be in light of the politics in Skopje. Due to the lack of direct engagement with the government in Sofia, the government led by Hristijan Mickoski has failed to find a way to defuse hostilities with Bulgaria. Some political positions expressed in July 2024 regarding the constitutional changes and instability in Bulgaria are indicative of stalled diplomacy. The public and diplomatic stance indicates a strategy of delay and resistance.
Despite the government’s hope that the issue would move in North Macedonia’s favor, this has not happened so far. The government in Skopje first waited for the US administration of President Donald Trump to open a new door for a strong position towards Bulgaria. In the inability to find a solution with Bulgaria, the blame has been indirectly attributed to the EU. Although the EU has not changed its position regarding the opening of negotiations with North Macedonia, unfortunately, the government continues to remain in a deadlock with no option to resolve the issue or move it beyond zero status. Here, North Macedonia is showing that it is finding it difficult to do more and show that it is a serious member of the european family.
The EU, despite internal divisions over the enlargement with new members from the Balkans, has been generous and has helped the Balkan countries. To prove that the EU has been interested in the success of the Balkan states and North Macedonia in their EU accession process, the union has allocated 6 billion euros, a sum of which also goes to North Macedonia. Now, where does the problem lie? Austrian MEP Thomas Waitz, the European Parliament (EP) rapporteur for North Macedonia, said in early March 2025 that he would focus his work mainly on convincing Bulgaria to lift its veto on North Macedonia. “I think it is very clear that bilateral issues should be discussed between countries, but not have a decisive influence on the negotiation process.” “Yes, you need to have good neighborly relations for EU membership, but the negotiation process should not be taken over by member states to resolve bilateral issues,” Waitz said. “Clear statements from the European Council, the European Commission, and the government in Sofia are needed to provide the guarantees that North Macedonia seeks to ensure that it will not face additional unforeseen demands along the way.” However, the problem appears to be more complex.
Current politics in Skopje and Sofia are showing a lack of political will for good cooperative relations. For example, if North Macedonia wanted to take significant steps to resolve the problem with Bulgaria and move much faster than others towards the EU, it could have done so. As national issues have taken a nationalist turn, and resentment has grown in Skopje and Sofia, it will be challenging to resolve any issues, because past North Macedonian governments have shown decades of difficulty managing interstate relations. Officials in the new government say the opposite, saying they are open. This approach could lead Mickoski’s government to misjudge its relations with Bulgaria, as well as its internal challenges. What we have heard since 2017 can be assessed as only words and very few concrete steps to move on from the current situation. Reckless accusations and statements will not improve relations.
In terms of the aspiration for EU membership, the actions show that matters are headed in the wrong direction. What the government in Skopje needs to do is be diplomatically creative by proposing acceptable solutions, such as the creation of a new international commission on historical and identity issues. Here, several different approaches should be seen to preserve identity and move forward in the EU. If not, the status quo will lead to various bargaining without results. To prevent sliding into the abyss, the government in Skopje, whether with the help of the EU and the US, should prove that it is committed to the work of the railway connecting North Macedonia with Bulgaria. The Skopje-Sofia accusations about Corridor-8 show that one of the parties is not being sincere. To be clear, all parties in North Macedonia, regardless of who has been in government, have played politics with emotions. And here we are now, the open issue awaits a solution until the first step that North Macedonia should take with the constitutional amendment, which would establish bulgarians as a minority group in North Macedonia. Such a move would be well received by the EU and Bulgaria, which would mean the rapid integration of North Macedonia into the EU. Over the past four years, the problem has been the lack of a majority to approve the constitutional amendments, but after the formation of the government by VMRO, with VLEN and ZNAM in June 2024, the obstacle for the required numbers has been reached. The numbers are there, but there is no political will. However, since June 2024, we have not seen any diplomatic action from the Mickoski government to engage Sofia in comprehensive talks.
The official Skopje’s justifications have been numerous, ranging from fear of new demands to demands for a new EU approach to the Brussels negotiation procedure with North Macedonia. Mickoski’s or any future government must undoubtedly receive guarantees from Sofia or abroad that there will be no new demands. Although Mickoski’s government relies on the assumption that citizens understand that he and the government do not have it so easy to wrap up the issue of macedonian identity, nevertheless, the conclusion or launch of an economic project with Bulgaria is likely to prove that the government is waiting for the right time to make constitutional changes and start talks. Some other skeptics say it is difficult for North Macedonia to move on from its past policies of quarreling with its neighbors. In the case of Bulgaria, a balance must be struck between domestic concerns, bulgarian and EU demands. Failure to reach an agreement with Bulgaria risks reviving the already growing nationalism. The “Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation” between Bulgaria and North Macedonia of August 2017 should be turned into a true friendship, not a treaty that produces hostility between the two states. North Macedonia has been a candidate country for the EU since 2005. Initially, Greece vetoed it in 1991 – an issue that ended in August 2018 with the signing of the “Prespa Agreement” and ratification in 2019. In November 2020, Bulgaria vetoed North Macedonia, which continues to be an obstacle to this day. While citizens are waiting to see what will happen, the issue with Bulgaria will not resolve itself.
Mickoski’s government should start from the fact that the agreement would be better reached now, because the future could extend to a different situation, which could have consequences not only for identity. If the same dynamics continue, many analysts have expressed fear that the politics of resentment may not bring anything. The delay in the problem with Bulgaria is expected to make North Macedonia’s path to the EU more difficult. The consequences of such policies could deepen the growing emigration and fuel interethnic tensions, affecting the internal affairs of North Macedonia. Can the government avoid such scenarios? This fall and 2026 will reveal more about the open issue with Bulgaria, EU integration, and euroscepticism.
The article was written specifically for Portalb.mk. The publication rights are only owned by Portalb.mk and the author, according to the agreement between them